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Abstract. The answer in a nutshell is: yes, five years ago, but nobody has noticed. 
Nobody has noticed because the majority of social scientists subscribe to one of the 
following views: (1) the ‘anomalous’ behaviour observed in standard prisoner’s dilemma 
or ultimatum game experiments has refuted standard game theory a long time ago; (2) 
game theory is flexible enough to accommodate any observed behaviour by ‘refining’ 
players’ preferences; or (3) it is just a piece of pure mathematics (a tautology). None of 
these views is correct. This paper defends the view that game theory as commonly 
understood is not a tautology, that it suffers from important (albeit very recently 
discovered) empirical anomalies, and that it is not flexible enough to accommodate all the 
anomalies in its theoretical framework. In particular it cannot accommodate the existing 
evidence about reciprocal behaviour in many classic game-theoretic contexts. I conclude 
trying to explain why it took so long for experimental game theorists to design 
experiments that could adequately test the theory. 
                                                 
* The ideas of this paper have been presented at seminars at the University of Turin, the 2005 Economic 
Science Association meeting, and the 2005 British Society for the Philosophy of Science conference. I 
should thank the audiences at these meetings, Jim Cox, John Dupré, and Jim Woodward for their comments 
and suggestions. All the remaining mistakes are mine. 
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Introduction 
 
In his famous ‘Rational Fools’ article, Amartya Sen noticed that 
 
if today you were to poll economists of different schools, you would almost 
certainly find the coexistence of beliefs (i) that the rational behaviour theory is 
unfalsifiable, (ii) that it is falsifiable and so far unfalsified, and (iii) that it is 
falsifiable and indeed patently false (Sen 1977, p. 325). 
 
Three decades later, Sen’s poll would give pretty much the same results. But although the 
confusion highlighted by Sen was not unjustified in the seventies, this is not the case 
anymore. Or so I will argue in this paper. This paper defends the view that Game Theory 
(GT) as commonly understood is not unfalsifiable, that it suffers from important recently 
discovered empirical anomalies, and that it cannot accommodate the anomalies in its 
theoretical framework. 
 
A few clarifications are due before we start. First, I’ll be concerned with GT in its 
descriptive (or ‘positive’) interpretation only. This is not to suggest that the normative 
version of the theory of rational choice is philosophically uninteresting, or irrelevant for 
its appraisal as a model of actual behaviour. However, the discussion of the normative-
descriptive hybrid status of GT is worth a separate paper.1 
 
Second, asking whether GT has been refuted does not imply a commitment to some naïve 
form of falsificationism. ‘Refuted theory’ here is taken somewhat loosely to mean a 
theory that suffers from severe empirical anomalies. Minimally, a refuted theory cannot 
be interpreted as universally true in its intended domain of application. I take that many 
scientists are interested in refutations at least for this reason, quite independently of the 
pragmatic status of the theory itself. (Whether it should be rejected or whether it’s been 
superseded by one of its rivals, for example.) Towards the end of the paper in fact I shall 
argue that, despite its shaky empirical record, one should not rush to any conclusion 
regarding GT’s prospects as a research programme. 
 
Finally, this paper completely sidesteps underdetermination and Duhem-Quine problems. 
It’s not a paper about the methodological problems of empirical testing in general, but 
rather deals with the much more specific issue of GT’s relation with empirical evidence. 
It takes the available evidence as given, and assumes that all the reported data have been 
collected properly, by competent scientists who have correctly designed their 
experiments. Of course there are interesting issues in the methodology of experimental 
game theory that would be worth discussing in more depth, but that must be the topic of 
another paper. This one is about the interpretation of GT, and its descriptive power in 
light of the best scientific evidence to date. 
 
 
                                                 
1 On the interaction between normative and descriptive interpretations of the theory of individual decision 
making, see e.g. Guala (2000) and Starmer (2000). 
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Is game theory a tautology? 
 
Like other ‘successful’ scientific theories, GT can be (and is) interpreted in different 
ways. Thus first of all it will be necessary to clarify what we are dealing with: what has 
been refuted (if at all)? Under a standard interpretation, GT is aimed at modelling and 
understanding people’s behaviour, in particularly when the outcome of their actions 
depends not only on what they do, but also on other people’s decisions. According to an 
influential textbook, 
 
Game theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help us understand the 
phenomena that we observe when decision-makers interact. The basic 
assumptions that underlie the theory are that decision-makers pursue well-defined 
exogenous objectives (they are rational) and take into account their knowledge or 
expectations of other decision-makers’ behavior (they reason strategically). 
(Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, p. 1) 
 
This characterisation rules out, first of all, so-called ‘mass-action’ interpretations of GT, 
as for instance in evolutionary GT models. GT, under the standard ‘epistemic’ 
interpretation, models individual behaviour as determined by players’ preferences and 
beliefs, under strong rationality assumptions. This does not mean that ‘mass-action’ 
interpretations are less interesting or promising than ‘epistemic’ ones, but simply that the 
latter is by far the most developed, used, and – crucially, for our purposes – empirically 
tested version of GT.2 
 
The standard textbook definition also rules out the interpretation of GT as a branch of 
pure mathematics. Although game theorists are keen to distinguish ‘pure’ from ‘applied’ 
GT, the former is not a piece of uninterpreted formalism. The Osborne and Rubinstein 
quote significantly mentions decision makers, expectations, knowledge, objectives, and 
behaviour, as the subject matter of GT. Of course there’s no mention of what these 
objectives may be, nor indeed of what the expectations are about. ‘Decision-makers’ is 
also left vague enough to be applicable to various real-world entities (individuals, firms, 
nations). But this just means that ‘pure’ GT is very abstract, rather than purely formal. 3 
The business of specifying preferences, beliefs, and the identity decision-makers is left to 
applied social scientists, and presumably varies depending on the intended domain 
application. 
 
There are some dissenters, however. ‘Pure’ game theorists often claim that their theory is 
just a tautology. Ken Binmore is a typical example: 
 
Mathematical theorems are tautologies. They cannot be false because they do not 
say anything substantive. They merely spell out the implications of how things 
                                                 
2 The distinction between these two interpretations goes back to John Nash’s seminal PhD dissertation. 
3 A similar point could be made (more elaborately, perhaps) by looking at the sort of solution-concepts that 
are explored and considered legitimate in GT. Rationality plays a prominent role in this activity, and 
rationality is not a purely formal concept. It is rationality for decision-makers, and more specifically 
decision-makers of the human kind. 
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have been defined. The basic propositions of game theory have precisely the same 
character. (Binmore 1994, p. 96) 
 
As with other claims of this kind, it is useful to ask first what is meant by ‘tautology’, and 
then what is supposed to be a tautology (Sober 1993, pp. 68-72). A tautology is, strictly 
speaking, a proposition that is true in virtue of the definition of its logical terms. This is 
probably not what Binmore has in mind. Most likely, he is thinking of sets of 
propositions such as: 
 
(1) Rational agents always choose uniquely dominant strategies. 
(2) ‘Defect’ is the only dominant strategy in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. 
(3) Therefore, rational agents always defect in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. 
 
This is an argument, not a proposition. It is a valid argument, in the standard logical 
sense: if the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true, independently of the 
truth of the premises. But whether each proposition in the argument is true or false is 
another question. In order to figure out whether it is true that rational agents always 
defect in the one-shot PD game, we need to check whether rational agents always choose 
uniquely dominant strategies, and whether ‘defect’ is the only dominant strategy in the 
one-shot PD game. 
 
But how do we check that (1) and (2) are true? Binmore and the other supporters of the 
‘tautology’ interpretation presumably argue that (1) and (2) are analytic: they are true in 
virtue of the meaning of the non-logical terms that are in them. So ‘rational agent’ is 
defined as the kind of decision-maker that always chooses uniquely dominant strategies. 
And the one-shot PD game (Table 1) is by definition a game where ‘defect’ is the only 
dominant strategy.4 
 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 2, 2 0, 3 
Defect 3, 0 1, 1 
  
Table 1 
 
Of course there would be nothing to test, if GT was nothing but this set of propositions. 
‘Tautologists’ like Binmore however do not conclude that GT is empirically useless: 
 
One reason for emphasizing the tautological nature of these tools of the game 
theory trade is to direct attention of the critics away from the question of how a 
formal game is analyzed to the more rewarding question of how problems of 
human interaction should be modeled as formal games. (Binmore 1994, p. 169) 
 
                                                 
4 In representing games in normal (or strategic) form, I follow the usual conventions: the first number in 
each cell (or consequence, or outcome) represents the payoff of the ‘Row’ player, the second number the 
payoff of the ‘Column’ player. Each row/column represents a strategy (or act) available to that particular 
player.  
 5 
So what can be tested presumably is the claim that certain GT models can be used to 
understand (predict, explain) certain specific real-world situations.5 This seems analogous 
to what some versions of the semantic view of scientific theories (e.g. Giere 1988) call a 
‘theoretical hypothesis’ (but perhaps the expression ‘empirical hypothesis’ would be less 
misleading). A testable hypothesis would be, for example, that the one-shot PD game can 
be used to explain (predict, etc.) the behaviour of experimental subjects playing the game 
in Table 2. 
 
 Left Right 
Up $2, $2 $0, $3 
Down $3, $0 $1, $1 
  
Table 2 
 
So far it looks as if the tautologists are just quibbling about what a scientific theory is. 
According to them, a theory is just the formalism. According to most scientists and 
philosophers, it is an interpreted formalism, or a formalism plus a set of ‘bridge 
principles’ that connect it to empirical reality. 
 
But in fact some tautologists are more radical than that. Take Binmore again: “Game 
theorists understand the notion of a payoff in a sophisticated way that makes it 
tautologous that players act as though maximizing their own payoffs” (1994, p. 98). This 
strategy is defended by drawing an analogy with biology: 
 
[in applications of GT in evolutionary biology] the payoffs are [...] defined in 
terms of an organism’s “fitness”. This makes it a tautology that the organisms that 
survive will seem to behave as though seeking to maximize their payoffs in the 
game under study. The same tautological flavor is also to be found when rational 
behavior in games is studied, provided that the payoffs in the game are interpreted 
according to the theory of revealed preference [...]. (Binmore 1994, p. 104) 
 
Revealed preference theory was originally proposed as an attempt to reduce the notion of 
preference to that of observed choice (Samuelson 1938). There is remarkable confusion 
nowadays about what revealed preference theory really amounts to in neoclassical 
economics (cf. Hausman 2000, Dowding 2002), but tautologists like Binmore seem to 
stick close to the original understanding: “In revealed preference theory [...] choice 
behavior becomes the primitive. One observes some of the choices that a player makes 
and then argues that he is making choices as though he were equipped with a preference 
relation.” (1994, pp. 105-6). 
 
The first thing to notice is that Binmore’s analogy with fitness in evolutionary biology is 
not unproblematic. According to a common interpretation, the fitness of a trait X is not 
whatever proportion of offsprings with X are observed in the next generation. Fitness is 
                                                 
5 See also Binmore (1999, p. F18): “[a consolidating experimentalist] does not see as his task as asking 
whether economics works or not. He already knows that sometimes it does and sometimes it does not. The 
task is to classify economic environments into those where the theory works and those where it does not.” 
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the expected reproductive success of a trait, or the probability – given the forces of 
natural selection – that a member of the next generation of offsprings will have trait X. 
Probability here can be (and usually is) interpreted as a propensity, rather than a 
frequency. This probability may or may not be reflected approximately in the frequency 
of X in the next generation. The reason it may not be is that other factors besides natural 
selection may interfere with the heritability of X: random genetic drift, typically, or 
mutation, migration, recombination. It’s not true that “We know who will survive 
because they are fittest” and “We know who are fittest because they survive” (Binmore 
1994, p. 98). 
 
Interpreted this way, fitness is not a ‘tautology’. This of course does not, by itself, 
prevent one from interpreting utility in terms of revealed preferences. But there are other, 
independent reasons not to do so. Preferences cannot be ‘read off’ directly from 
behaviour because choices are determined by individual preferences and beliefs. This 
point is perhaps obscured by the convention in GT of assuming common knowledge of 
the game that is being played (‘I know that you know that I know ... (and so forth) that 
such and such strategies are available, with such and such payoffs, and that all players are 
rational’). Of course if we assume common knowledge of the game, then we can derive 
preferences from observed choices. Whether the derivation is correct, however, depends 
crucially on the correctness of the common knowledge assumption. 
 
It’s not clear however why one should want to take such a strong empiricist stance 
regarding preferences, if one is willing to simply assume a priori a certain configuration 
of players’ beliefs (see also Hausman 2000). Why accord to the two key variables of GT 
a different status? In fact the fathers of GT were fully aware of the need to mutually 
determine, by means of observable procedures, the structure of individual preferences 
and beliefs. 
 
 
Savage measurements 
 
I’ll keep using an old-fashioned philosophical distinction, according to which a scientific 
theory can be analysed in two sets of elements. On the one hand, a set of abstract 
concepts connected by theoretical relationships. On the other, some ‘bridge-principles’ 
that link the concepts with empirical reality or measurement procedures. We don’t have 
to assume that these two elements are precisely separable. The distinction is useful only 
for heuristic purposes, and shouldn’t be read as implying any deep philosophical 
commitment on the theory-observation distinction, or on the nature of scientific theories.6 
 
What are the bridge principles of GT? In The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
von Neumann and Morgenstern famously introduce a procedure for measuring (or 
‘operationalising’) cardinal utility. Expected Utility Theory (EUT) is the ‘bridge’ 
connecting GT with the real world. 
                                                 
6 In fact, it should be broadly compatible both with old-fashioned ‘syntactic’ approaches (like the 
‘Standard’ or ‘Received View’ of theories) and with more fashionable ‘Semantic’ approaches (where the 
‘bridge principles’ are sometimes called ‘theoretical hypotheses’, see above). 
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The story has become part of the folklore of GT. Von Neumann was happy to build the 
theory on the generic notion of ‘payoff’. Indeed, he conceived of payoffs basically as 
objective (material, possibly monetary) properties of outcomes or consequences. 
Morgenstern persuaded von Neumann to recast the theory in utility jargon, in order to 
appeal to the average neoclassical economist. Von Neumann quickly scribbled on the 
back of an envelope the measurement procedure that was to appear in the second (1947) 
edition of The Theory of Games. 
 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s measurement procedure of utility is well known: 
starting with three outcomes x, y and z such that x > y > z, the utility scale is normalized 
by assigning U(x) = 1 and U(z) = 0. A subject is then presented with the choice between 
the prospect y for sure and the prospect [p, x; (1 – p), z]; if she prefers either the risky 
prospect or the sure outcome, the probabilities in the former are varied until she is 
indifferent. At this stage, the utility of y can be computed by U(y) = p, and the procedure 
iterated for any value between x and z. 
 
This clearly assumes that we already know subjects’ probability assignments or beliefs. 
In practice, since von Neumann and Morgenstern restrict their discussion to lotteries with 
objective probabilities, we just assume that subjects’ assignments mirror the objective 
probability measures (their beliefs are accurate representations of the world). When this 
is not the case, subjective probability assignments must be worked out from people’s 
choices, in a way that is symmetric to the one above. Start with people’s preferences 
about sets of consequences, and then infer which states of the world are considered more 
probable from the observation of individuals’ acts (or choices of strategy). In practice, it 
is usually assumed that more money is preferred to less, and then individuals are offered 
money prizes associated with certain types of event. But again one has to take a firm 
fulcrum (preferences for the measurement of beliefs, beliefs for the measurement of 
preferences) for the lever of expected utility theory to lift any weight. 
 
These procedures were first sketched by Frank Ramsey (1926) and then refined by 
Leonard Savage (1954). Since the latter’s systematisation has become standard in 
contemporary GT, I shall refer to it as the Savage measurement procedure. According to 
‘kosher’ GT, the application of the theory should start with a Savage measurement, i.e. 
with the identification of players’ utilities and beliefs. Once this has been done, one can 
begin to figure out what kind of game they are playing, and apply the solution concepts 
of GT.7 Most experimental GT is not kosher from this respect, however. This causes 
                                                 
7 Sometimes Binmore writes (and speaks, in conversation) as if his revealed preference theory were nothing 
but an application of Savage’s measurement procedure. He says for example (‘hawk’ here stands for 
‘defect’, ‘dove’ for ‘cooperate’): “the preference (dove, hawk) pA (hawk, hawk) is deduced from the prior 
information that, if Adam knew he had to choose between only (dove, hawk) and (hawk, hawk), then he 
actually would choose (hawk, hawk)” (1994, p. 106). Notice that according to this formulation one does not 
observe behaviour in a PD game first, and on the basis of this, define the preference scales. Rather, one 
elicits the preference scales by pair wise comparison of the various outcomes (as in a simplified Savage 
measurement – more about this below), and then uses such information to predict behaviour in the PD 
game. This does not make a ‘tautology’ out of GT, because of course there may well be a mismatch 
between the preferences as ‘revealed’ in the two situations. And it does not reduce the concept of 
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problems, because the results of experimental GT can be (and are) criticised for not 
testing the theory at all. 
 
 
What kind of game are we playing? 
  
Take the one-shot PD game again (Table 1). Here the free riding strategy is Down for 
Row and Right for Column, leading to a payoff of 2 units each. These strategies are 
uniquely dominant, and determine the unique rational solution (the Nash solution or Nash 
equilibrium) of the game. Informally, whatever Column will do, Row will be better off 
by playing Down; and similarly Column will always be better off by playing Right, given 
what the opponent does. But both would be better off if they played Up-Left. The Nash 
equilibrium in a one-shot PD game is not a Pareto-optimal solution. 
 
 Left Right 
Up 2, 2 0, 3 
Down 3, 0 1, 1 
 
Table 1 (again) 
 
As is well known, in a ‘standard’ PD experiment a considerable number of subjects play 
cooperatively (Up-Left, in the game above) (Rapoport and Chammah 1965). The game 
played in such experiments, however, is not necessarily the one in Table 1. It is the one 
already presented in Table 2, which is reproduced here for comparison. 
 
 Left Right 
Up $2, $2 $0, $3 
Down $3, $0 $1, $1 
 
Table 2 (again) 
 
The ‘naive’ interpretation of these experimental results is that many human beings 
(fortunately) do not behave as predicted by the theory. But a number of game theorists 
reject this interpretation. They say, for example, that the preference rankings of the 
subjects who play cooperatively in these experiments are inadequately represented by the 
numbers in the classic prisoner’s dilemma game matrix. Or, in other words, that Table 1 
and Table 2 are not necessarily isomorphic for all experimental subjects. 
 
According to the orthodox interpretation of game theory, the numbers in Table 1 
represent the (ordinal) structure of agents’ preferences. Thus, the argument goes, if we 
observe anomalous behaviour in the experiment, the initial conditions postulated in the 
model were probably not instantiated in the experiment. Subjects were not really playing 
                                                                                                                                                 
preference to that of choice, because in order to identify preferences in the simplified Savage procedure you 
need to postulate a given belief structure. 
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the prisoner’s dilemma game, but another game of their choice. A game like the one in 
Table 3, for example. 
 
 Left Right 
Up 2, 2 0, 0 
Down 0, 0 1, 1 
 
Table 3 
 
This game has two Nash equilibria. The transformation of Row’s payoff from 3 to 0 in 
the Down-Left cell can be explained, for example, by Row’s anticipated feelings of guilt 
in letting down Column, given that the latter was willing to cooperate (and vice-versa for 
Column in Up-Right). The PD game is then transformed in a coordination game, where 
Up-Left is a legitimate equilibrium. 
 
Binmore has been a vocal supporter of this interpretation: 
 
[those who are anxious to deny that people seek only their own narrowly conceived 
selfish ends] argue that the players may care about the welfare of their opponents, 
or that they may actively want to keep their promises out of feelings of group 
solidarity or because they would otherwise suffer the pangs of a bad conscience. 
Such players will not be playing the Prisoners’ Dilemma. They will be playing 
some other game with different payoffs. (Binmore 1992, pp. 313-314) 
 
In other words: it is a common fallacy to interpret the payoffs in a GT model as 
representing physical properties or (typically) monetary outcomes. They represent 
utilities. And people may derive utility from (or, more precisely, may have preferences 
about) whatever features of the consequences they happen to care about – including other 
players’ payoffs, one’s own anticipated guilt, regret, and so forth. 
 
This is in line with the liberal tradition that informs much of economic theory. According 
to this tradition, it is important that social scientists remain neutral about the contents of 
people’s tastes and beliefs. From a normative viewpoint (and economics is a theory of 
rationality as well as a theory of actual behaviour) the requirements imposed on 
preferences and beliefs should be purely formal, of the consistency type. (Remember 
Hume: it is perfectly rational to prefer the end of the world to a scratch on my finger.) So, 
even though economists often assume for simplicity that outcomes are defined strictly in 
monetary terms, this ought not to be always the case: outcomes can (and should, 
whenever required) be redescribed or ‘refined’ to include whatever properties the agents 
find relevant.  
 
This idea (the possibility of ‘redefining’ or ‘refining’ the consequences) has provoked 
controversy since the early days of expected utility theory.8 An explicit attempt to 
                                                 
8 A (probably incomplete) list of contributions to this debate includes Samuelson (1952), Tversky (1975), 
Sen (1985, 1993), Machina (1989), Bacharach (1988), Hammond (1988), Sugden (1991), Broome (1991), 
Anand (1992), and Munier (1996). 
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legitimise it is due to Peter Hammond, who puts the ‘refining’ strategy right at the core of 
his ‘consequentialism’. Consequentialism, as usually understood, is the idea that 
rationality is forward-looking and independent of procedural considerations.  
 
Consequentialism requires everything which should be allowed to affect decisions 
to count as a relevant consequence – behavior is evaluated by its consequences, 
and nothing else. (Hammond 1988, p. 26) 
 
Hammond’s ‘consequentialism’ tries to transform genuine consequentialism into a trivial 
proposition: 
 
If regrets, sunk costs, even the structure of the decision tree itself, are relevant to 
[...] behavior, they are therefore already in the consequence domain. Indeed the 
content of a [...] theory of behavior is then largely a matter of what counts in 
practice as a relevant consequence, rather than whether consequentialism and 
other abstract axioms are satisfied. (1988, p. 26) 
 
Many people find this problematic. It is often argued that if you are allowed to redefine 
consequences (or the argument of the utility functions) as you like, then economic theory 
becomes empty. This critique goes back a long time,9 but is essentially misguided. It is a 
false dilemma to stipulate that either the payoffs are to be interpreted as money, or the 
theory is empty. People have preferences, and they are preferences about something. 
There’s no reason a priori to assume that all individuals care about the same things. One 
difficult empirical task in testing GT is precisely to figure out what they care about. Once 
we know what they care about, we can check whether they are rational – i.e. whether the 
models of rational choice provide a correct account of human behaviour. The theory is 
not empty. It can be used to say something substantial about the real world. 
 
To illustrate this point, consider an analogy with classical mechanics. Newton’s law of 
universal gravitation (F=ma) can be interpreted (and usually is interpreted) as a 
description of the relation between mass, acceleration and force once all the forces at 
work in a given system have been taken into account. As such, it seems hard to falsify. 
Imagine a fictional classical (pre-relativity) physicist observing a prima-facie violation of 
the law; before coming to any conclusion about the validity of the universal law of 
gravitation, she would begin to search for some unobserved forces at work on the system 
under study. Such forces could be gravitational, but also of some other kind, not (yet) 
described by Newtonian mechanics (electromagnetic forces, for example). But the 
physicist’s behaviour wouldn’t make the law empty: the law says that once all the forces 
have been taken into account, they obey the universal law of gravitation – and in some 
cases we might well be wrong in computing the total force in the system.10 
 
                                                 
9 Cf. e.g. Hutchison (1938, pp. 114-115); for recent versions, see Machina (1989, pp. 83-87); Rosenberg 
(1992, Ch. 5); and Anand (1993, pp. 105-106). 
10 This fictional example is not far from historical reality, as shown by Lakatos (1970), Putnam (1974) and 
others. 
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So, there is a division of labour in classical mechanics: on the one hand general principles 
like the law of universal gravitation are supposed to hold for all bodies and all forces. On 
the other, more specific laws connect specific kinds of forces to other quantities of 
interest. For example: gravitational forces are described by equations like F=G(m1m2/r
2); 
electrostatic forces by Coulomb’s law (F=q1q2/4piε0r
2), and so on. Similarly in economics 
one can envisage a division of labour between general principles of rational play like 
those of game theory, and the more specific task of connecting payoffs (utilities) with 
empirical reality, by specifying the argument of the utility function. 
 
Jim Cox expresses this viewpoint clearly in a recent paper: 
 
In their seminal work on game theory, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, 
1947) thought it necessary to simultaneously develop a theory of utility and a 
theory of play for strategic games. In contrast, much subsequent development of 
game theory has focused on analyzing the play of games to the exclusion of utility 
theory. In the absence of a focus by game theorists on utility theory, it is 
understandable that experimentalists testing the theory’s predictions have 
typically assumed that agents’ utilities are affine transformations of (only) their 
own monetary payoffs in the games. This interpretation of game theory 
incorporates the assumptions that agents do not care about others’ (relative or 
absolute) material payoffs or about their intentions. There is a large experimental 
literature based on this special-case interpretation of the theory, which I shall 
subsequently refer to as the model of “self-regarding preferences.” The part of the 
literature concerned with public goods experiments and trust and reciprocity 
experiments has produced replicable patterns of inconsistency with predictions of 
the model of self-regarding preferences. For example, the patterns of behavior 
that have been observed in one-shot trust and reciprocity games are inconsistent 
with the subgame perfect equilibria of that model. But this does not imply that the 
observed behavior is inconsistent with game theory, which is a point that has not 
generally been recognized in the literature. (Cox 2004, pp. 260-261) 
 
The message is: one cannot proceed to make any inference about the empirical status of 
GT without figuring out first what individuals care about. If they care about fairness, for 
example, it is still entirely possible that they are rational maximisers of utility – once the 
latter has been defined appropriately to capture fairness considerations. The definition of 
the utility function as ranging exclusively over one’s own monetary outcomes is 
unnecessarily restrictive and in principle can be relaxed to allow for more varied (and 
interesting) individual preferences. 
 
 
Problems with refinements 
 
The possibility of refining the options doesn’t make the theory empty. There are still two 
ways in which GT can be refuted. First, suppose that cooperators in the one-shot PD 
game really do care only about their own monetary outcomes (and prefer more money to 
less). Perhaps they do not understand the concept of dominance; perhaps they do not pay 
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enough attention to the structure of the game. If either of these hypotheses were correct, 
the theory would turn out to be false. 
 
This is just a speculation. As a matter of fact most experimental game theorists (including 
Cox) agree that to assume selfish preferences over money only is too restrictive. There is 
more in the argument of our utility functions, and this extra content should be 
accommodated in the framework of GT. 
 
This leads to the second way in which GT could turn out to be refuted. Suppose that 
subjects cared about something else besides their own monetary gain, but that GT wasn’t 
flexible enough to accommodate this ‘something else’ within its framework. Were the 
bridge principles unable to account for the observations, in particular, the only option left 
would be to modify the theory of rational play (the ‘hard core’ of GT).  
 
This possibility is rarely discussed, perhaps because of a taken-for-granted analogy 
between folk psychology and formal rational choice theory. According to our everyday 
understanding, any observed pattern of behaviour can in principle be ‘rationalised’ by 
imputing to the individual an appropriate – perhaps highly sophisticated – structure of 
beliefs and desires. The intertemporal coherence of beliefs and desires can also always be 
restored by simply modifying their contents – no matter what the individual does or is 
going to do next. Alexander Rosenberg is the philosopher who has most forcefully argued 
that “the fundamental explanatory strategy of economic theory is of a piece with that of 
our ordinary explanations of human action” (1992, p. 118). And the view that “no 
intentional action can be internally irrational” (in the above sense), has been dubbed the 
Plato Principle by Donald Davidson (1982, p. 294). 
 
The Plato Principle however is false when applied to GT, because the formal theory of 
rational choice is less flexible than folk psychology, and as a consequence has more 
limited explanatory resources. This applies to the theory both in its normative and in its 
descriptive version, but given the focus of this paper, let us phrase it in a descriptive 
idiom. There is a tension between certain refinements of the consequences and the 
Savage measurement procedure. Consider the sequential prisoner’s dilemma game in 
Figure 1 (borrowed from Hausman 2000). The first monetary prize between brackets at 
each end-node is A’s monetary payoff, the second one is B’s monetary payoff; the letters 
f, g, etc. are arbitrary labels assigned to the consequences. Clark and Sefton (2001) report 
experimental data where 40% of first-movers (A) play a trust move (Up) in a game of 
this kind, and second-movers (B) respond Left 35% of the time. 
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($2, $2) 
f 
($0, $3) 
g 
($3, $0) 
h 
($1, $1) 
k 
A 
B B 
Up Down 
Left Right Left Right 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Can we ‘refine’ A and B’s preferences in order to account for this behaviour? It depends. 
Suppose A and B are motivated by two sets of considerations. They prefer more money 
to less, but also have a taste for fairness. In equation (2) deviations from fairness are 
defined with respect to a standard pif: 
(1)   )( ∑
≠
−−−−=
n
ij
j
f
jii
f
iiiiV pipiβpipiαpi . 
Player’s i’s payoffs are denoted by pii, and the parameter α introduces i’s concern for the 
pattern of distribution of the payoffs (as opposed to his own payoffs). When α=0, the 
player is purely selfish. Everything on the right-hand side of α represents fairness 
considerations. When the standard of fairness is equality of payoffs (pii
f = pij
f), this 
becomes a model of inequality aversion (Levine 1998, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton 
and Ockenfels 2000). The parameter β weighs the impact of the first set of fairness 
considerations (inequality in one’s payoffs) against that of the second one (inequality in 
other players’ payoffs). 
 
This is just one example, representative of a wider class of models of fairness 
preferences. Two points are worth noticing. First, these are not alternatives to the theory 
of rational play at the core of GT. They are attempts to pin down the bridge principles 
connecting GT with observed behaviour (or better: with observable features of the 
outcomes, like the distribution of monetary gains pii). Such models play in the hands of 
the refiners, and their empirical successes in predicting experimental data are not failures 
of GT. 
Secondly, these models add to the refiners’ weaponry because they are genuinely 
consequentialist in spirit. The extensive form of the game in Figure 1 is quite redundant. 
The theory in (1) can be applied simply by looking at the normal form of the game (Table 
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2). In principle, this is fully compatible with the orthodox Savage measurement 
procedure. Indeed, equation (1) could be read as a generalisation of some class of 
preference structures observed by means of the Savage procedure. 
 
How would this measurement work, in practice? All we have to do is to present player B 
with the choices in Figure 2: 
 
 
B 
($2, $2) 
f’ 
B 
Left Left Right Right 
($0, $3) 
g’ 
($3, $0) 
h’ 
($1, $1) 
k’ 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
B’s preferences, as revealed in these binary-choice tasks, will suffice to predict her 
behaviour in the sequential PD game, if they conform to the preference structure of (1). In 
this scenario, f=f’, g=g’, h=h’, and k=k’. 
 
But let’s suppose instead that B is not primarily motivated by distributional concerns. The 
reason she plays the equal payoff could be that she is reciprocating A’s first move. She 
chooses Left in response to a ‘trust’ move because she wants to be kind towards A, but 
has no reason to do so when A has not played at all. In this scenario, looking at B’s 
choices in Figure 2 will be useless (see also Hausman 2000, p. 108, for this point). 
 
 
Modelling reciprocity 
 
Reciprocity is a tricky notion. Consider the basic reciprocity formula: 
 
(2) (.)](.)[ σκρpi += iiV . 
 
Here ρ is a parameter weighing the impact of reciprocity considerations against the usual 
self-interested preference for one’s own monetary gains (pii). κ is a kindness function, 
representing how ‘nice’ or ‘offensive’ j’s behaviour is towards i. The other function, σ, 
captures i’s reaction to j’s behaviour. A negative kindness combined with a positive 
reaction (or vice-versa) results in a reduction of overall utility (Vi). Reacting negatively to 
negative kindness, and positively to positive kindness, leads to an increase of overall 
utility.  
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At first sight, it may look as if the arguments of these two functions could be filled in 
consistently with the spirit of genuine consequentialism. But this is unlikely. Consider the 
reaction function first: a negative reaction is one that hurts j, typically by reducing her 
payoff with respect to a given standard or reference point.The standard is most naturally 
interpreted as what j would have achieved, had i played a different strategy. We shall 
represent this possible payoff with pi'j . Similarly, j’s kindness towards i depends not only 
on i’s relative payoff with respect to some absolute standard (say, equality, as in most 
models of ‘distributional’ preferences), but on what i could have achieved, had j played 
differently. Again, we will use pi'i to represent such counterfactual payoff, where the 
counterfactual mark (') refers to the fact that it is a possible payoff – an outcome that 
could in principle be achieved in this game.11 
 
(3) )]()([ jjiiiiV pipiσpipiκρpi ′−′−+= . 
 
The most advanced models of reciprocity in this spirit make use of the tools provided by 
psychological game theory (first proposed by Geannakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti 1989). 
In psychological game theory the payoffs depend not just on the material structure of the 
consequences, but also on players’ beliefs. Following Matthew Rabin’s (1993) seminal 
work, reciprocity can be represented as involving a calculation of what player i believes 
that j believes that i will play. Player j’s intention is perceived as ‘nasty’ when i believes 
that j believes that i will make a ‘nice’ move, and yet j chooses a strategy that reduces i’s 
monetary payoffs with respect to the reference point.12 
 
A discussion of psychological GT is besides the scope of this paper. How counterfactual 
considerations are modelled is not crucial: perhaps intentions are not even relevant all the 
time; perhaps in some cases B reacts to A’s ‘nasty’ moves only to signal that she’s 
making a mistake, or in order to push the outcome towards a Pareto-superior solution (B 
might be driven by selfish motives, that is, and might have a crude stimulus-response 
model of A’s behaviour).13 What really matters is the role of counterfactual 
considerations themselves. The identification of the preferences associated with each 
consequence requires an examination not just of what will happen, but also of what might 
have happened. To put it another way, the utilities are path-dependent: they do not just 
depend on the outcomes taken in isolation, but on the whole structure of the game. 
 
 
Reciprocity cannot be ‘refined’ 
 
Remember Hammond: “Consequentialism requires everything which should be allowed 
to affect decisions to count as a relevant consequence”; if reciprocity affects decisions, it 
                                                 
11 I’m simplifying a lot here. The counterfactual ‘reference point’ in k(pii – pi’i) is in many occasions better 
represented as pii
’f, where f stands for the ‘fairest’ payoff that could have been achieved in the game. It is 
likely that pii
’f be intendified in each game by comparing i and j’s various possible payoffs. 
12 Falk and Fischbacher (2000) and Dufwemberg and Kirchsteiger (2003) are the two prominent models in 
this tradition. 
13 As a matter of fact, in some dilemma experiments some subjects ‘reciprocate’ even when they are 
playing against a computer (Houser and Kurzban 2002).  
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must be accounted for at the moment of describing the consequences, according to 
consequentialism. 
 
This turns out to be problematic in the Savage framework, however. The problem has 
been around for a long time. In a letter from Robert Aumann to Leo Savage, in 1971 (cf. 
Dreze 1987), the issue is first raised of how to distinguish acts (say, getting an umbrella) 
from consequences (e.g. getting wet). Aumann points out that the distinction is fuzzy. 
Savage agrees but says in a very pragmatic vein that this may not matter as long as “I 
seem to be able to couch my decision problems in terms of them”; for “... a consequence 
is in the last analysis an experience” (Dreze 1987, p. 79). 
 
But this is overoptimistic. Savage (1954) defines acts as functions from states of the 
world to consequences. (For example: the act ‘taking the umbrella’ assigns the 
consequence ‘staying dry’ both to the state ‘it rains’ and to the state ‘it does not rain’; 
‘not taking the umbrella’ assigns the consequence ‘getting wet’ to the state ‘it rains’ and 
the consequence ‘staying dry’ to the state ‘it does not rain’.) All the existing versions of 
expected utility theory prove the existence of the EU function (representation theorem) 
from the assumption that decision makers form preferences over every act that can 
possibly be constructed by combining consequences with states of the world. John 
Broome (1991) calls this feature the rectangular field assumption (see also Sugden 
1991). 
 
The rectangular field assumption is not implied by expected utility theory, from a logical 
point of view. But the existence of the expected utility function can be derived from the 
rectangular field assumption and other fundamental principles (Broome 1991, p. 117). So 
a violation of the rectangular field assumption does not logically contradict expected 
utility theory (although we still lack an alternative representation theorem that does 
without that assumption). It does, however, seriously invalidate the Savage measurement 
procedure. 
 
For measurement purposes it is crucial that acts can be constructed arbitrarily. Take any 
state of the world, and combine it with any consequence in our theoretical universe: 
whatever we obtain by these arbitrary combinations must make sense, and must be 
something the agent can form a preference about. Now suppose that the consequence g of 
player B in the sequential PD game of Figure 1 is defined as ‘getting $3 but being sorry 
for player A’ (who had offered to cooperate). This is surely meaningful in the context of 
a game like the one above. But does it make sense in a different context, where that 
consequence does not follow from the act of choosing Right in the above game (after A 
has chosen Up)? 
 
We must distinguish two cases (Broome 1991, p. 116):  
(1) The (refined) consequence is causally implausible outside the specific game; for 
example, why should B feel sorry for A, if they are not playing the game of Figure 1? 
(2) The (refined) consequence is logically impossible outside the specific game; for 
example, imagine we redefined g as ‘getting $3 after player A has chosen Up’: clearly 
this is inconsistent with the game that B is playing in, say, Figure 2. 
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To sum up: when too much is included in the description of outcomes, the consequence 
itself remains tied to the specific game and cannot be used to construct arbitrarily other 
acts (or functions from states of the world to consequences) (Sugden 1991; see also 
Munier 1996, and Verbeek 2001). Refining options to include reciprocity considerations 
clearly raises problems of the second (logical) kind. If players care about ‘what might 
have been’, then this must be included in the definition of a consequence. Indeed the 
consequences must be refined so as to include entire branches of the game. But then one 
cannot use such consequences to create arbitrarily other acts, if such acts are to make 
sense at all. The Savage measurement procedure is not flexible enough to neutralise 
reciprocity counterexamples.14 
 
 
Evidence of reciprocity 
 
Reciprocity has been discussed by experimental game theorists for more than two 
decades now. Most of this discussion however has taken place before the existence of 
reciprocal motivations had been established empirically. Consider social dilemma games 
again. As already mentioned, many subjects seem willing to cooperate in a one-shot 
sequential PD game. But this behaviour of course does not constitute direct evidence in 
favour of reciprocity, because the mutual cooperation outcome provides an equal 
distribution of the material payoffs (see Figure 1 above) and therefore might be preferred 
by players that are averse to inequality. 
 
A crucial test for reciprocity must implement some variant of the Savage measurement 
procedure. Players’ preferences over a set of outcomes must be observed first ‘in 
isolation’, and then in the context of a game that is likely to trigger reciprocity 
considerations (or more generally a concern for ‘what might have been’). The 
comparison between choices in these two contexts will provide direct evidence for 
reciprocity as well as a proper test of GT. Several experimenters have done precisely this 
in recent years, although experimental game theorists themselves do not seem to have 
noticed the general implications of these results.  
 
The experiments usually start with so-called Dictator’s Games. A Dictator’s Game 
(Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton 1994) is not even a strategic game, strictly 
speaking, for it involves a straight choice between different allocations. The outcome is 
not determined by an interaction between the players: one player chooses, and the other 
takes whatever has been chosen. A Dictator’s Game then, like a stripped-down version of 
the Savage measurement procedure, simply elicits the (ordinal) structure of preferences 
of the experimental subjects. Since the ordering, rather than the cardinality, of 
preferences is what matters in many simple experimental games, the full-blown Savage 
method is unnecessary. 
 
                                                 
14 Regret is another motivation that can lead to problems with the rectangular field assumption (see Sugden 
1986), also outside the realm of game theory, in individual decision making and rational choice theory in 
general. Unlike reciprocity, however, we don’t have very good evidence about regret right now. 
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Once preferences have been elicited in the Dictator’s Game, it is then possible to check 
whether players behave rationally in more complex strategic situations. Take the 
sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Jim Cox (2004) uses a slightly more complex 
version of this setting, called the ‘investment game’. Player A here chooses how much of 
a given endowment to pass over to B. Whatever A chooses, the sum will be tripled by the 
experimenter. Player B then decides how much of this ‘investment’ to return to A. 
 
After the game is played, Cox offers some subjects exactly the same sums which have 
been selected by players of type A in the first experiment – except that type-B players 
this time do not know that it’s an ‘investment’ from another player (the sum is presented 
as a ‘pie from the sky’). The experimenter can therefore check whether the behaviour of 
B players in this Dictator’s Game is radically different from their behaviour in the 
investment context. As a matter of fact it is: in the investment task the average amount 
returned by B players is more than twice the amount allocated to A in the Dictator’s task 
($4.94 vs. $2.06). 
 
Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin (2002) use even simpler settings (Figure 3). The first 
part of the experiment (on the left) is again a Dictator’s Game. The first payoff between 
brackets is A’s monetary gain and the second one is B’s, as usual. The figures under each 
outcome represent the observed distribution of player Bs’ choices. A majority of subjects 
goes for the Pareto-superior outcome, but there is significant evidence of inequality 
aversion too. 
 
 
($400, $400) 
       .31 
($750, $400) 
     .69 
B 
($400, $400) 
       .06 
($750, $400) 
     .94 
B 
($750, $0) A 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
The same (sub-)game is then transferred in a different context, where B is asked to make 
the same choice after player A has already made a move (Figure 3, on the right). As we 
can see, choices in this second setting can differ radically from those in the simple 
Dictator’s Game. Concerns for equality in this specific case seem to be largely swept 
away by B’s desire to respond to A’s ‘kindness’ (A could have chosen unilaterally to give 
B absolutely nothing, after all). 
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($400, $400) 
       .52 
($750, $375) 
     .48 
B 
($400, $400) 
       .93 
($750, $375) 
     .07 
B 
($550, $550) A 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 7 presents another example of the importance of ‘what might have been’. In the 
dictator’s game (left), B players display a considerable willingness to sacrifice a small 
part of their material payoff to enhance A’s income. This willingness disappears in the 
enhanced game (right), where B moves knowing that A has refused the (550, 550) split (a 
phenomenon that Charness and Rabin dub ‘concern withdrawal’). 
 
These results are confirmed by experiments conducted by Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, and 
Urs Fischbacher (2003). Here, one ‘branch’ of a mini-ultimatum game is kept constant, 
while the alternatives open to A (the first-mover) are varied. In two of the experimental 
tasks (represented in Figure 5) the difference in B’s responses is remarkable: the rejection 
rate of the ($8, $2) offer jumps from .46 to .91 depending on whether the alternative 
possible offers are perceived as ‘nice’ ($5, $5) or ‘nasty’ ($10, $0).15 
 
($8, $2) 
.46 
($0, $0) 
.44 
($5, $5) 
1 
($0, $0) 
0 
B B 
($8, $2) 
.91 
($0, $0) 
.9 
($10, $0) 
.1 
($0, $0) 
.90 
B B 
A A 
 
Figure 5 
 
                                                 
15 The ‘$’ sign here is used simply to mark that the payoffs are to be read as monetary gains, not as 
utilitities. Some experiments, in fact, used other currencies than dollars. 
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It’s important to stress that these patterns can be generalised only with much difficulty. 
Reciprocity, if this is really the motivation behind these observations, is an erratic 
phenomenon. Charness (1996) reports no significant difference in a gift-exchange game 
played with intentional offers vs. a gift-exchange with randomly generated offers. People 
are as willing to ‘return’ the gift in the random game as in the ‘intentional’ context. 
Andreoni and Miller (2000) show that choices in a Dictator’s Game context can be used 
to predict with a reasonable approximation the behaviour of subjects playing a Public 
Goods’ experiment. Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) find no difference between 
behaviour in social dilemmas with ‘forced’ first moves vs. behaviour in the same setting 
with voluntary moves. People’s cooperative attitude seems to be the same regardless of 
the intentionality of the first mover’s choice. McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003) however 
report the opposite result in a similar experiment.16 
 
These results seem to be very sensitive to the details of the design, and reciprocity is an 
elusive and complex phenomenon. But minimally, it is possible to say that in a number of 
settings the structure of the game matters. Subjects do not just care about the material 
consequences but also about the alternative moves that are available and the process that 
leads to each consequence. They care about what might have been and how we got where 
we are now. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
GT is the piece of contemporary economics which has had the most dramatic impact 
outside the boundaries of the discipline. Sixty years from its inception, GT is widely used 
in fields as different as political science, sociology, biology, psychology, law, military 
strategy and, last but not least, philosophy. Its empirical status, then, is an issue of wide 
scientific and philosophical relevance. 
 
For many years a considerable degree of confusion about the status of GT was created by 
the proliferation of anomalous but indecisive evidence. Now that experiments of the right 
kind have been done – experiments that really test GT – it has become impossible to 
argue that the anomalies can be digested as usual. In order to see that, it is necessary to 
appreciate the crucial distinction between the theory of rational play and the bridge 
principles that connect the former with measurable properties of the real world. These 
two elements are sometimes conflated, sometimes treated as if they were completely 
independent. This probably leads to the (mistaken) belief that GT is as flexible an 
explanatory tool as the folk-psychological theory of action of which it constitutes a 
formal refinement. 
 
The Savage procedure (and the rectangular field assumption upon which it is based) 
imposes some limits on the amount of information that can be incorporated in the 
                                                 
16 Bicchieri (2005) argues, convincingly in my view, that these ‘contradictory’ results can be explained by 
the fact that social norms (like reciprocity) are highly context-sensitive and usually must be ‘triggered’ or 
‘cued’ by some factor telling us that ‘this is a context where the norm applies’, i.e. where it is generally 
expected that people behave according to the norm. 
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description of the outcomes of a game. These technical limitations make sure that the 
spirit of genuine consequentialism (players are forward looking, subscribe to sub-game 
perfect rationality, and so on) is preserved. 
 
It’s important to appreciate the precise implications of what just said: nothing prevents us 
from applying the tools of GT and EUT across a limited range of experimental games, 
assuming the subjects have consistent preferences over a limited number of highly 
specific (or highly refined) options, once the outcomes have been (re-)described so as to 
include the overall structure of the game.17 Such preference information might be useless 
outside the specific game-situation, of course, but could be used to predict and summarise 
choices in a limited set of games. What can’t be done, if consequences become overly 
sophisticated, is to have a unique utility function across the set of all the games that can 
be constructed using those (and other) consequences. 
 
From this respect, the ‘naive’ and often ridiculed convention of using monetary payoffs 
as initial conditions or proxies of players’ utilities, has much to recommend. It is well 
known among historians and philosophers of science that the success of scientific 
theories is often heavily dependent on the creation of instruments of observation that 
allow adequate measurements of the key variables. Consider Galileo’s telescope, but also 
the microscope for the atomistic research programme, the steam engine for 
thermodynamics, and so forth. Monetary payoffs are objective and observable, and 
provided we have the right theory at hands, can be used readily to generalise to other 
situations that are similar (in the monetary payoffs structure) to those that were tested in 
the laboratory. If this route is followed of course the ‘core’ of GT must be modified to 
account for the existing evidence. The partnership between the standard theory of rational 
play and the Savage procedure has proven to be unsustainable (given the evidence). We 
can keep the core of GT and reject the bridge principles (the Savage procedure), but face 
difficult problems of applicability. The other viable alternative is to keep the bridge and 
change the theory of play. 
 
Why did it take such a long time to design and run the ‘right’ experiments to test GT? 
One reason is that, surprisingly, the Savage procedure was never part of the ‘official’ 
toolkit of the experimental game theorist. This is the result of complicated historical 
factors, in particular the fact that the methodology of experimental economics (especially 
so-called ‘Induced Value Theory’ – cf. Smith 1982) was developed mainly in the context 
of market experiments and was aimed at the active inducement, rather than the passive 
observation of preferences. But a proper discussion of these issues would require a long 
                                                 
17 The Savage procedure prescribes first to measure the utility of the outcomes of a game in isolation and 
then to see how the subjects behave in more complex strategic situations (games). The rectangular field 
assumption is required if one wants to elicit utility measures for a wide range of consequences, or in other 
words if one is trying to specify the fine-grained structure of an individual’s utility function. But the 
application of GT in each specific instance of course does not require this full-blown measurement to be 
carried out in practice. In fact, as we have seen, the simple games that are customarily tested in the 
laboratory often require only a simplified or stripped-down version of the Savage procedure – because the 
mere ordinal ranking of a handful of outcomes is what really matters. 
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detour into the history and methodology of experimental game theory, which cannot be 
attempted here.18 
 
Interestingly, the refutation of GT took place simultaneously with the theory’s most 
remarkable successes in policy-making. The reform of inefficient (usually centralised) 
methods of allocation and the design of new markets (for electricity, telecommunication, 
health services, etc.) is now increasingly informed by the principles of GT. These 
principles moreover are often subjected to preliminary testing in controlled conditions 
before being applied to real-world situations. These tests, however, are usually aimed at 
spotting and avoiding precisely the sort of problematic situations that the theory is unable 
to deal with. Other-regarding preferences for instance can simply be ruled out by design, 
by making sure that the available information and the structure of the game prevent such 
concerns from arising in the first place. This is economic engineering, as opposed to 
theory-testing: the world is modified so as to ‘fit’ the conditions that allow the theory to 
work. But since engineering successes often do drive science, we should not rush to any 
conclusion about the future of GT. Its refutation and its remarkable success can (and will) 
coexist in the minds of many social scientists for whom the theory is, and is likely to 
remain, the best game in town. 
                                                 
18 See Guala (2005), however, especially Ch. 11. 
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